Welcome to FCNL's Greater Middle East Diplomacy Update for January 8, 2010
"To put it simply, all key issues in the Middle East… are inextricably linked." Iraq Study Group, December 2006
Iran: Sanctions Action Shifts to Senate; Administration May Blunt Final Bill
After the House voted 412 to 12 with 4 votes of "present" on December 15 to approve H.R. 2194, the Iran Refined Petroleum Sanctions Act (IRPSA) that seeks to cut Iran's gasoline imports, attention shifted to the Senate, where the Obama administration appears to be making an effort to amend provisions of the Senate version of the bill that could cripple U.S. diplomacy with allies and Iran.
A move by Majority Leader Harry Reid (NV) before the December recess to approve the Senate's Iran sanctions bill (S. 2799) under a fast track procedure with no debate or amendments was halted after the administration requested a delay. Deputy Secretary of State James Steinberg said in a letter to Senate Foreign Relations Chair John Kerry (MA) that the bill in its current form could weaken international support for U.S. efforts. He also said the administration had "serious substantive concerns" with the bill, including "the lack of flexibility, inefficient monetary thresholds and penalty levels, and blacklisting that could cause unintended foreign policy consequences."
Senate leaders expect to approve the Iran sanctions bill shortly after the Senate returns from recess January 19, after further negotiations with the administration. How far those negotiations will succeed in meeting the administration's concerns is unclear. Currently even administration supporters are reluctant to appear "soft on Iran" in light of the strong lobby backing for the bill from the American Israel Public Affairs Committee and its allies, and the new wave of reform protests and government repression in Iran.
House Hearing Questions Wisdom of House Vote
Earlier the same day that the House voted overwhelmingly to approve IRPSA a subcommittee hearing chaired by Rep. John Tierney (MA) produced compelling testimony arguing, in effect, that the bill represented the worst imaginable approach to Iran sanctions.
RAND Corporation analyst and former Ambassador James Dobbins argued that sanctions such as the gasoline embargo in the House bill that "target Iranian society as a whole would promote the least desirable results, that is to say the consolidation of a police state under the Revolutionary Guard." Dobbins said unilateral action by the U.S that included the imposition of sanctions on foreign companies "would seem to offer the worst combination of effects-penalizing the population, strengthening the regime, embroiling the United States in endless disputes with its allies and disrupting the current international solidarity in opposition to Iran's nuclear aspirations."
Other witnesses expressed similar views, leading Rep. John Duncan (TN) to remark that it was "unfortunate" that the House was poised to overwhelmingly approve IRPSA because "the witnesses have made a pretty convincing case that these sanctions or this legislation is not a good thing to do, particularly-at least at this time." (See witnesses' prepared testimony here; see excerpts from the hearing here.)
FCNL's Analysis
The exact outcome of the current Iran sanctions debate and legislative push is still in doubt. Some form of Iran sanctions legislation resembling the House-passed Iran Refined Petroleum Sanctions Act is all but certain to become law. Only a last-minute agreement among Iran, the United States, and its allies on the three-month old proposal for Iran to exchange most of its low-enriched uranium for nuclear fuel rods to make medical isotopes could forestall final action.
Still in doubt, however, is how much success the administration can achieve in modifying the final legislation to allow executive discretion in applying and easing sanctions and to avoid mandatory penalties against foreign companies that will antagonize U.S. allies. Administration officials have made several anonymous statements recently implicitly critical of broad sanctions that would impact ordinary Iranians and have argued for narrowly targeted sanctions against Iran's Revolutionary Guard and companies involved in Iran's nuclear program. The administration has not, however, offered any high-profile public criticism of the Iran sanctions legislation moving through Congress and Senate allies are reluctant to weigh in heavily with pro-sanctions colleagues in the absence of a strong administration push.
The outcome may yet be a watered-down bill that does a minimum of harm to administration and international efforts to persuade Iran to modify its nuclear program to meet international concerns; or the outcome could be a stringent but ineffective and counterproductive bill that increases conflict with Iran and makes a future agreement much harder to achieve.
